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Abstract 
Though the vast majority of academic authors and business consultants still treat financial 
participation and participation to decision-making as ifthey were separate issues, we feel that 
these issues are to a large extent interdependent. The study of this interdependence is the 
topic of this paper. In the first part, we define the concepts of financial participation and 
participation to decision-making and we suggest the concept of social capital as the 
theoretical tool that will allow us to describe the interaction between the effects of the 
different forms of worker participation. In the second part we describe the main results of an 
empirical investigation of the relationships between financial participation, participation to 
decision-making and social capital. 
Introduction 
Employee participation is an ambiguous concept: "to participate" means "to take part in", but 
also "to be a part of'. Both do not always go together: one can feel and be part of an 
organisation in which one does not have a say, e.g. a soldier in the anny, but one can also 
take part to decisions concerning an organisation of which one is not a part, e.g. external 
consultants. This ambiguity of the participation concept acquires another dimension when 
one applies it to employees: employee participation refers both to financial participation and 
to participation to decision-making (PDM), alternatively named shop-floor democracy, 
structural participation, or even empowennent. 
The relationship between financial participation and PDM is a complex one: on the one hand, 
they refer to different problems, fields and techniques: the issue of shopfloor organisation 
and the issue of rewards; on the other hand, they are related concepts, and complementary 
instruments because both financial participation and PDM give the employees the 
opportunity to be part of and to take part to the life oftheir organisations. 
The link between financial participation and PDM is a matter of internal coherence of the 
human resources policy of an organisation. If one wishes workers to feel part of their 
corporation, and requires that they should take part to the decisions by providing valuable 
infonnation, it would be inconsistent not to give these same employees any share of the 
corporate profits. Inconsistency between any two domains ofHRM would lead the employees 
to misinterpret the signals sent by the management, and would inevitably cause a loss of 
efficiency (Beer et ai., 1984). 
Beer et ai. further claim that decisions regarding PDM are more fundamental than decisions 
regarding financial participation: "We believe that the most central issue for employees as 
stakeholders is the question of influence: how can they act to improve or protect their 
economic share, psychological satisfaction, and rights? How is such influence to be 
exercised?" (Beer et ai., 1984: 40) 
However, decisions about financial participation are closely tied to decisions regarding PDM, 
firslty because "the real power of a gain-sharing plan comes when it is supported by a climate 
of participation and when various structures, systems, and processes involve employees in 
decisions that will improve the organisation's performance and result in an organisation-wide 
bonus." (Beer el al., 1984: 145) A second reason is that financial participation can levarage 
the power-sharing effect ofPDM when it gives the workers access to the capital of their 
company. When workers own shares, they not only have a right to dividends, but they also 
gain a powerful influence instrument through the voting rights in the general assembly. 
In spite of the interdependence between financial participation and PDM, the vast majority of 
academic authors and business consultants continues to treat financial participation and PDM 
as if they were separate issues (Black & Gregersen, 1997; Festing et aI., 1999). Therefore, the 
theoretical models offered in the literature are attemps to understand the processes underlying 
either financial participation or PDM, but rarely both. Hence, we will start by an exposition 
of the separate theories of PDM and financial paIiicipation. At the end of this literature 
survey, we will indicate how the study of both issues could be combined into a powerful new 
theoretical framework. 
2 
Part I: Different forms of participation: definitions and goals 
I.l. FINANCIAL PARTICIPATION 
Financial participation basically refers to any system whereby the financial gains (or losses) 
of a company are shared with its workers. Additionnally, a number of conditions should be 
fulfilled in order to distinguish financial participation from mere bonus schemes I: (J) it 
should have a lasting character; (2) it should involve at least a majority of workers and, in 
those cases where all workers are not involved, the group who benefits from the scheme 
should be defined with objective criteria (e.g. years of employment); (3) the participation 
scheme should be tied to some measurable corporate performance index; (4) it should be 
organised on the plant or corporation level. 
l.l.l. Profit Sharing 
First of all, workers may be paid a premium dependent on some key corporate performance 
indicator. Though this form of financial participation is generally labelled "profit"-sharing, 
other key indicators may be considered than after or before tax profits; examples involve 
productivity increases (gain-sharing), value added, turnover, or any other common 
performance measure. The crucial element is that those schemes link individual pay with the 
results of the collective effort. 
One first effect of profit-sharing is to increase the total pay of an employee, when the 
company makes a profit. Pay is a fundamental (though not the only) determinant of employee 
satisfaction, hence of commitment and productivity (Herzberg, 1968). Therefore, financial 
participation can be assumed to have an impact on commitment and productivity through an 
increased employee satisfaction. However, pay satisfaction is the result of a complex 
interplay of several psychological attitudes: perceived fairness and equity (Adams), 
relationship to performance (Lawler, 1981), assessment of procedural aspects (Lawler, 1981), 
etc. Hence we expect this effect to be significant, though not overwhelming. 
A second effect of profit-sharing is that it provides individual workers with an incentive to 
work harder as an individual, since his own individual pay becomes dependent, amongst 
other things, from his own individual performance, corporate profits being nothing more than 
the result of the aggregated individual performances. However, the larger the workforce, the 
more individual performance will have a diluted effect on aggregate performance, whilst the 
closer incentives are to individual performance, the better they will effectively stimulate 
workers to increase their individual effort. Therefore, the incentive effect will function only 
under the following conditions: either the workforce is small, or the cohesion ofthe 
workforce is strong. This cohesion can be enhanced e.g. by a strong corporate culture, by a 
strong trust climate, or by a high level of cooperation between the workers. 
Fortunately, profit sharing is expected "to improve economic performance through increased 
workplace cooperation and information flow." (Kruse & Blasi, 1995: I). Financial 
participation can function as an important training instrument, in order to help workers 
understand the link between their own task and global corporate operations (Hatcher & Ross, 
1991). The creation of a financial participation scheme often provides corporate management 
with an opportunity to teach the employees the basics of cost-accounting, profit and loss 
statements, balance sheets, etc. (Festing et al., 1999) Once they understand the basics of 
1 Those conditions are largely similar to the definition of participation to profits and enterprise results 
suggested in the first PEPPER report (Uvalic, 1991), and widely adopted thereafter in the literature. 
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financial management, the workers are more likely to see how mutual aid and cooperation on 
the workfloor may lead to financial benefits. 
Summarising, profit sharing provides the workers with a potentially powerful motivator and 
incentive that will unleash its full effect when the link between individual effort and 
collective performance is made clear to all the participants.But profit sharing suffers from 
one limitation: it focuses the attention on one particular and unidimensional performance 
indicator. 
1.1.2. Capital participation 
Capital participation can be defined as any scheme aiming at giving the workers access to the 
capital of their corporation. Capital participation is able to overcome the limitation of profit 
sharing because it ties the participation premium of the workers to the market value of the 
company's stock, which reflects (at least to some larger extent than any other singular 
financial performance indicator) the future prospects of the company. This kind of 
participation can also take many different forms in practice. 
Corporate savings plans are afirst kind of capital participation. These plans consist of 
encouraging individual savings by giving workers a premium when they save money in order 
to buy their company's shares. On the one hand, the company can give its workers a premium 
atop of saved money, which in the next step can serve to buy shares on the stock market. On 
the other hand, the company can buy shares on the capital markets on its own account and 
sell them back to its workers at a discount price. Most often, workers are required to keep the 
shares acquired with the help of their company for a minimum number of years, ranging in 
most cases from one to five years. 
Corporate savings plan, when they are accessible to the whole workforce, have the advantage 
of giving everyone equal opportunities to buy shares, without compelling anyone to do so. 
The workers who eventually decide to step into the corporate savings plan will have to make 
a personal contribution and can therefore be considered really interested by this opportunity 
to step into the capital of their company. This is not the case when shares are distributed for 
free to every worker, which is a second way of setting up capital participation. But in both 
cases, capital participation can be assumed to have the same incentive effects as profit 
sharing, and additionally to focus the workers' attention on the long term evolution of the 
company. Workers' efforts are not driven by a short-tenn measure like e.g. next year's 
turnover, but by the market valuation of the growth potential of their company. Hence capital 
participation provides an additional incentive to develop the core assets of the company in 
order to assure the company of a bright future. When the return to the shareholders drives 
managerial performance, capital participation ensures that the collective workers' effort will 
be driven by the same variable. 
A third way to encourage stock ownership by workers is to transform the premium given 
within the framework of a profit sharing scheme into shares: this method combines the 
advantages of profit sharing and capital participation, the main advantage of profit sharing 
W.r.t. capital participation being that the impact of workers' collective performance on 
particular performance indicators, e.g. value added or productivity, is often much clearer than 
its impact on the share price of a corporation. The share price, even when it expresses a good 
approximation of the future prospects of the corporation, is indeed influenced by a number of 
factors which are totally exogenous to the corporation itself, like e.g. interest rates, oil prices, 
economic cycles, etc. 
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Though those three methods capture the essence of most capital participation plans, it should 
be noted that the "capital" itself can take various forms: ordinary shares, non-voting shares, 
or stock options. Though technically stock options are distinct from shares, we consider 
option plans to be one kind of capital participation, because options provide their owners 
essentially with an access right to ordinary shares. In addition, shares acquired through stock 
option plans are often required to be kept for a number of years, just as ordinary shares 
acquired through corporate savings plans. The main difference is that stock options give their 
owners differed access to capital, thereby emphasising the long term evolution of the 
corporation. Capital participation plans using non-voting shares as the participatory 
instrument fit perfectly within the preceding discussion of capital participation. However, 
when the participation scheme ends up in worker ownership of ordinary shares, it provides 
these workers with direct influence on the decisions of the general assembly through the 
voting rights attached to those shares? 
Before turning to PDM, let us summarise the main characteristics of capital participation. 
Capital participation provides the workers with a powerful incentive to increase their efforts 
and focus their attention on the long term development potential of the corporation. Savings 
plans have the advantage of concentrating efforts on the most committed employees without 
excluding anyone, but they are often unable to bridge the distance between individual effort 
and share performance. Profit-based capital participation, by focusing the attention on one 
particular indicator of collective performance, are one way to bridge this distance. Whichever 
technique is being used, if the workers are given the chance to become owners of ordinary 
shares, they will have the opportunity to exercise direct control, and to a smaller extent some 
influence, on management's decisions. This will certainly help them increase their 
understanding of the corporation's success factors, hence help them direct their efforts 
towards these particular factors. 
In order to be able to appreciate fully the empirical part of this research, the reader should be 
aware of the incentives provided and limits set by the Belgian law to the development of 
financial participation. However, an overview oflegal matters relevant to financial 
participation lies outside the scope of this paper and will not be provided here.3 
1.2. PARTICIPATION TO DECISION-MAKING 
Participation to decision-making CPDM) refers to any corporate programme which allows 
employees to take part to some decision-making processes within the corporation. This kind 
of employee participation is most often referred to as structural participation in the literature, 
though this term often doesn't reflect adequately what it designates. Indeed, it is obvious that 
participation to decision-making can take many forms: it can be consultative as well as 
substantive, informal as well as formal; formal participation can itself be either direct, on the 
factory floor, or indirect, with worker representatives sitting in the the corporate board, etc., 
and only the latter kind of participation does according to us really deserve the adjective 
"structural" . 
Instead of discussing every kind of PDM we will structure our discussion of PDM in three 
broad categories that appear to capture a large proportion of all PDM-initiatives: participation 
on the workfloor, participation to social issues (which is largely regulated), and participation 
to strategic issues. Though during this discussion it should not be forgotten that any 
classification scheme is "to some extent C ... ) artificial, since successful participation may 
2 The opportunity to take part in the general assembly makes this last kind of capital participation come 
very close to strategic PDM, which will be discussed in the next section. 
3 See e.g. De Grauwe (2000), Dehaene (1998), De Wortelaer (1996) Belgisch Staatsblad 28.10.1999. 
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involve the interaction of several formal participation schemes." (Levine & D' Andrea Tyson, 
1990: 191) 
1.2.1 Participation all the work floor 
Participation on the workfloor is mostly voluntary, informal and direct, hence sometimes 
short-term, but can also be formalised if the management or the unions wish to. Participation 
in work and workplace decisions focuses on the organisation of work and other shopfloor 
issues important to workers, such as task rotation, work schedules, etc. Quality circles and 
autonomous teams qualify as examples of participation in work and workplace decisions. 
Participation on the workfloor, by its voluntary nature, may vary from consultative to 
substantive participation and involves in some cases a real delegation of decision-making 
power regarding team arrangements such as e.g. setting the work pace, given the overhead 
constraints of output goals set by the management. 
Participation on the workfloor is commonly implemented in order to achieve two things. 
Firstly, it can enhance workers' morale and a good atmosphere on the workfloor by giving 
the workers a chance to voice their concerns regarding their daily life at work to a manager, a 
team leader, ajoint managers-workers councilor any other person who has some effective 
power to take decisions about this kind of minor problems. Secondly, when workers are 
encouraged to voice not only their concerns but also their suggestions regarding the 
improvement of work processes, participation on the workfloor is an essential instrument to 
tap the operational know-how possessed by experienced workers (Manz, 1992). The process 
of taking and implementing decisions about operational issues can indeed be smoothed out 
when the people who will support the consequences of this decision are also involved with 
the decision process itself. 
1.2.2. Participation to social issues 
By social issues we mean those issues that are typically the topic of management-union 
negotiations: terms of employment, health and safety at work, work circumstances, etc. 
Participation to social issues is largely mandatory, i.e. regulated by the law, hence this is the 
most common form ofPDM in Belgium as well as in most other continental European 
countries (Knudsen, 1995). This kind ofPDM is most often formal, organised on a long-term 
horizon, and indirect, i.e. based on mechanisms of representative democracy (e.g. elected 
shop stewards). Mandatory representative participation to social issues involves typically a 
rather small influence, but encompasses broader, though well-defined, topics than the other 
kinds ofPDM. 
In Belgium, mandatory PDM involves workers' councils, health and security committees, and 
mandatory management-union dialogue (Koene et al., 1991). The aim of mandatory 
participation is to protect the interests of the workers against the power of the employers, and 
one of its consequences is indeed a redistribution of power in favour of the workers or their 
unions. However, this power is unevenly distributed over the different decision issues: unions 
have gained voice in discussions about pay, terms of employment and job security, but still 
have no say about matters of job design, work organisation, investment decisions, and 
business strategy. Besides, mandatory participation was designed solely with the aim of 
protecting the workers, and without considering the corporation's broader interests. 
Therefore, corporations cannot expect to gain anything from this kind of PDM, except a good 
social climate, provided both parties are able to co-operate on the basis of reciprocal trust; 
but such co-operation on the basis of reciprocal trust between workers and management can 
also lead to a good social climate without mandatory participation. 
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1.2.3. Participation to strategic decisions 
Participation to strategic decisions is without doubt a rare occurrence, though the few known 
examples show how powerful this can be (Maaloe, 1998; Streeck, 1984; Whyte, 1991). By 
participation to strategic decisions we mean those schemes that allow workers to influence 
decisions made at the board level: strategic investments,joint-ventures, take-overs, mergers, 
acquisitions, development of new product lines, and decisions regarding the distribution of 
profits. In Belgium, this kind of participation is voluntary; by the very nature of the issues 
involved, it is formal and long-term oriented, and most often indirect. Just like participation 
on the workfloor, which is also voluntary, participation to strategic decisions ranges from 
mere transmission of information to real co-decision procedures. 
Examples of participation to strategic decisions include joint management-workers 
committees and representatives of the workers in the board of directors. The latter is the most 
frequent and most frequently studied in the literature (Whyte, 1991; Streeck, 1984). Reasons 
to include a representative from the workers in the board of directors are: legal arrangements, 
as in Germany; company by-laws; voluntary decisions; and stock ownership by the workers -
i.e. capital participation. This last possibility is for the vast majority of workers the most 
straightforward way to gain some influence on the board of directors of their company, 
though it can be hardly possible to achieve when the company is very large and when even a 
fraction of its equity represents huge amounts of money, that workers can never afford unless 
a corporate-level stock ownership plan encourages them to buy shares. In any case, if workers 
wish to exert some influence on the strategic decisions of the corporation through their 
shares, they have to organise themselves and group their shares, e.g. by setting up a workers' 
cooperative (Lambrechts & Van Steenbergen, 1999). 
Participation to strategic decisions may be another way oftapping workers' know-how and 
experience, but that is less relevant than it is to participation to workfloor decisions, because 
obviously workers are less familiar with financial and strategic issues than they are with 
operational issues. But something else is at stake here: allowing workers to participate to 
strategic decisions is the one best way to ensure that the corporation will in the long run 
strike a balance between the interests of at least some of its stakeholders (Evan & Freeman, 
1995). Such a balance between the interests of the various stakeholders is required for the 
company to survive in the long run (Leader, 1999). This fits within the view that a 
corporation is not solely an instrument to generate profits for the shareholders.4 
Summarising this brief sketch of PDM, we can note that the three kinds of PDM lead to 
different results and should be used as distinct instruments depending on the goals pursued 
by the management. This threefold distinction is confirmed by our empirical data (see § 
II.2.2). Mandatory participation to social issues primarily protects the interests of the 
workers, but good union relations can foster a good atmopshere at work and enhance other -
less formal - forms of dialogue and co-operation between managers and workers. 
Participation on the work floor is another instrument to improve the work atmosphere and the 
workplace ethos of the workers, but when it is correctly implemented it may have far greater 
effects in terms of workers sharing their operational know-how and experience with the 
managers to the benefit of productivity. Participation to strategic decisions will have an 
immediate negative impact on the managers, who will suffer from a power and status loss, 
but can have a significant positive impact on the long-term development potential of the 
corporation by the creation of a meeting place where workers, managers and shareholders 
will have the opportunity to defend their respective interests on a more or less equal footing. 
4 Though the stakeholder view of the corporation may be rejected by some shareholders, it is not a mere 
academic view, but also of the view of managers: 42 out of our 62 respondents claim their clients and 
workers to be more important than the shareholders for the long run development of their company. 
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1.3. FINANCIAL PARTICIPATION AND PDM: COMMON DIMENSIONS 
Several authors have claimed that financial palticipation and PDM mutually strengthen each 
other and, when combined, constitute a powerful lever to increase corporate performance. 
Levine & D' Andrea Tyson (1990) conclude their comprehensive review of the empirical 
literature by claiming that: "Most studies suggest that both participation and ownership have 
positive effects on productivity." ( Levine & D' Andrea Tyson, 1990: 202). Financial 
participation and PDM schemes should not be set up independently of each other: several 
other scholars have underlined the "necessity of appropriate integration" of PDM and 
financial participation (Ben-Ner & Jones, 1995: 537), arguing that "in order to have a 
significant individual motivational effect, return and control rights held by employees mllst 
be combined." 
Why is it necessary to integrate financial patticipation and PDM? A first reason is that "On a 
micro-level, employer and employee face a prisoner's dilemma. The fundamental problem of 
management is to convince employees that they will benefit by working hard and sharing 
ideas. If workers share their ideas with a non-cooperative management, management will 
merely raise the expected level of output; the result is that workers will end up working 
harder for lower wages. Conversely, if managers give autonomy and rewards to workers who 
restrict output, profits will plummet." (Levine, 1995) One obvious means to encourage 
cooperative behaviour between workers and management is to promote common objectives, 
e.g. making both workers' and managers' salary dependent on the same long-tenn 
performance indicators. However, how could the workers accept their salary to be made 
dependent upon any indicator which they do not have any power to influence? PDM is 
necessary to give workers and managers equal opportunities to control the evolution of their 
own rewards. 
A second reason is that financial participation is by definition restricted to schemes linking 
individual bonuses with group performance, and not individual perfonnance. Therefore any 
scheme of financial participation is likely to suffer from shirking and free-riding. This 
problem is often referred to as the lIN problem (Blasi & Kruse, 1995; Ben-Ner & Jones, 
1995) and follows from the assumption of human opportunism which grounds agency theory 
(Bowie & Freeman, 1992): though the worker is alone (1) to carry the cost of an additional 
effort, he will have to share the additional profit flowing from the increased company 
perfonnance with numerous (N) fellow-workers. Therefore the expected cost of additional 
effort is much higher than the expected gain, with the (expected) consequence that no 
additional effort is made. Hence, it is obvious that financial participation will only provide a 
satisfactory incentive structure if the group cohesion among the employees is sufficiently 
strong. This group cohesion can be achieved, amongst other things, by means of PDM, since 
the workers will be empowered through PDM to set objectives, to mutually control their 
progress and to sanction (positively or negatively) their colleagues' achievement. 
It has been argued that financial participation itself involves some important control 
mechanisms (peer control, social pressure, identification with the company, high-effort 
norms, ... ) that reduce the incentives to shirk, increase employee loyalty (Doucouliagos, 
1995), and enhance cooperation through better alignment of objectives (Ben-Ner & Jones, 
1995). But these control mechanisms cannot be sufficient on a stand-alone basis. Therefore 
some other authors have argued that financial participation should be supplemented with 
either participation to decision-making (Levine & Tyson, 1990) or scale reduction (Bowles, 
Gintis & Gustafsson, 1993) in order to develop trust within the corporation, trust being a key 
concept in the process of reducing opportunism (Frank, 1988, Sugden, 1993). 
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Other authors emphasize the role of management in developing a corporate culture that 
emphasizes company spirit, promotes group cooperation and encourages social enforcement 
mechanisms (Weitzman & Kruse, 1990). It is particularly important to develop the corporate 
culture and the company spirit if financial pal1icipation is organised on a subgroup-level, in 
order to avoid a contra-productive competition between the different subsidiaries of a same 
corporation, but more generally the corporate culture will be an important element to prevent 
employees allowed some share of decision-making power from making decisions "that trade 
off organizational productivity in favor of their individual welfare via working conditions and 
reduced effort" (Ben Ner & Jones, 1995: 542). The importance of "firm-level employee 
relations, human resource policies and other circumstances" affecting the corporate culture 
does also emerge from empirical research (Kruse & Blasi, 1995: I). Among the human 
resources practices supporting an ethos of responsibility - a sense of ownership - at work, 
Kruse and Blasi suggest the reduction of middle management and supervisory personnel, the 
introduction of work teams, task enrichment, training in individual skills and group problem-
solving techniques. Another suggestion is to ensure that the time-horizon of the employees is 
long enough: Weitzmann & Kruse (1990) have shown that if the employees expect to be 
employed for an indefinitely long time, they could have strong incentives not to display 
shirking behaviour. 
Of course, trust and ownership culture are not only a solution to the lIN problem, but also to 
the prisoners' dilemma facing employees and managers. Trust is even a prerequisite for 
successful PDM. Participation on the work floor may bear less immediate consequences for 
the company, but it requires workers to have the highest degree oftrust in the managers, 
since the evolution of productivity on the workfloor, positive or negative, can have a 
tremendous impact on decisions regarding the future size of the workforce. Inversely, 
participation to strategic decisions requires managers to have the highest degree oftrust in 
the workers, since it implies them to delegate a significant amount of decision-making power 
to the workers, on a lasting basis. 
In spite of the interdependence between financial participation and PDM, the vast majority of 
academic authors and business consultants continues to treat financial participation and PDM 
as if they were separate issues (Black & Gregersen, 1997; Festing et a!., 1999). Therefore, the 
theoretical models offered in the literature are attemps to understand the processes underlying 
either financial participation or PDM, but rarely both. Researchers have described various 
links that could exist between participation and company profits, either direct or indirect: 
optimised information flows, employee satisfaction and morale, increased cooperation, direct 
financial incentives, etc. (Erez, 1993; March & Simon, 1958; Argyris, 1957). 
In this paper we would like to emphasise the link existing between participation and company 
profitability through the development of organisational social capital, which we define as 
"resources embedded within, available through, and derived from the network of 
relationships" possessed by an organisation (Nahapiet & Goshal, 1998: 243). We would like 
to emphasise this particular element because we think that social capital is a particularly well 
suited conceptual tool to integrate the effects ofPDM and financial interaction. 
The definition of social capital provided above allows us to make a very clear distinction 
between (organisational) social capital and human capital, the latter referring to the 
(potential) skills possessed by the organisation'S members, or between social capital and 
intellectual capital, the latter referring specifically to the creative skills and innovative 
potential of the organisation. "Social capital" puts the emphasis on the potential or effective 
co-operation between the organisation's members by facilitating the action of individuals 
within a structure (Nahapiet & Goshal, 1998; Coleman, 1990). 
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Leana & Van Buren (1999) suggest associability, instrumental trust, relational trust and 
generalised trust as the four key elements of social capital. According to Nahapiet & Goshal 
(1998) organisational social capital includes three elements: a structural one - network ties; a 
cognitive one - shared vision, values and paradigm; and a relational one - including mainly 
trust, but also norms and expectations. They make the further distinction between 
instrumental trust, relational trust and generalised trust. We will use the more comprehensive 
classification scheme suggested by Nahapiet & Goshal, but we will use a slightly different 
terminology, in order to avoid the possible confusion between a structural element pointing 
at relationships and a relational element pointing at the quality of those relationships: we 
will refer to a structural dimension, a cognitive dimension and a behavioral dimension. 
Those three elements are deemed necessary for a network to achieve its function. 
The structural element is obviously relevant: when people occupying different positions in a 
network do not have any opportunity to direct or indirect communication, they will not be 
able to join strengths in order to serve the organisation. 
The behavioral element, i.e. trust, has been the focus of an impressive amount of academic 
research these last years and has been given many different definitions (Zand, 1972; 
Gambetta, 1998; Fukuyama, 1996; Mayer et al., 1995). Common features of these different 
definitions are risk and vulnerability: when the trustor choses to trust the trustee, he accepts 
to become vulnerable by the trustee in the sense that the trustor runs a risk that he is unable to 
hedge fully. Hence, if the trustee breaks his promise, the trustor will stand to loose something 
without any chance to recover fully what has been lost. When relationships within an 
organisation are characterised by a high level of trust, "people are more willing to engage in 
social exchange in general, and cooperative interaction in particular." (Nahapiet & Goshal, 
1998: 254). However the study of trust is complicated by the fact that it is considered "both 
an antecedent to and a result of successful collective action." (Leana & Van Buren, 1999: 
542) 
The shared vision refers to the extent to which workers and management acknowledge the 
existence of shared desires and common goals. That element is important because it is a pre-
condition for sharing knowledge. In participative firms, the shared vision is related to the 
concept of ownership culture, that appeared recently in academic literature (Ownership 
Associates, 1998). There still does not exist something like a "standard definition". However, 
the intuition underlying the concept is fairly straightforward: an ownership culture is a 
corporate culture that encourages workers to think an act as owners of their corporation. This 
means primarily that they will feel responsible for their corporation's present and future 
performance and that they will behave accordingly. Hopefully, it is clear to the reader that 
concepts like trust, power and ownership culture are deeply intertwined with each other. 
Trust implies some vulnerability, hence that the trustee at least potentially acquires some 
power on the trustor. The ownership culture can only materialise itself if the workers are 
given some degree of responsibility, hence of decision-making power. Hence the (re-) 
distribution of power will lie at the basis of our empirical dictinction between weak and 
strong forms of participation (cfr. infra). 
Theoretically, it is possible to establish several links between participation and social capital: 
indeed, Nahapiet & Goshal discuss four organizational factors that affect the development of 
social capital by shaping the social relationships: time, interdependence, interaction and 
closure; it is obvious that participation has an impact on these four factors. 
1. It takes time to build social relationships, particularly a trusting relationship. Therefore the 
continuity in social relationships, the stability and durability of these relationships are 
associated with high levels of trust and cooperation. Participation is a factor of stability in 
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organisations: empirical research often tends to show that both financial participation and 
PDM are associated with lower turnover among the workforce (Kruse & Blasi, 1995; 
Pearson, 1992). If participation takes the form of employee ownership, then it can also help 
the development of a stable shareholder group that can in turn develop long term 
relationships with the corporate board (Lambrechts & Van Steenbergen, 1999). Therefore, 
pm1icipation can be argued to be potentially associated with high levels of continuity. 
2. High levels of social capital are usually developed in contexts characterized by high levels 
of mutual interdependence between the different members of the organisation. PDM, being a 
matter of sharing decision-making power, has a straightforward impact on interdependence. 
The more power is shared, the more people from different organisational layers have to be 
consulted before a decision is taken. Therefore, PDM can be argued to be associated with a 
high level of interdependence. The case for financial participation is straightforward: when 
individual rewards depend on collective efforts, these rewards are obviously interdependent. 
3. Social relationships cannot be maintained without social interaction. Therefore, a high 
level of interaction is a necessary condition for the development of social capital. There are 
in most firms a myriad of opportunities for interaction, formal or informal, during meetings, 
performance appraisals or social events, etc. However, one form of interaction is likely to be 
more intensive in participative firms: it is the interaction needed to coordinate one's 
activities. In traditional firms, coordination is achieved through the formal hierarchy, and 
interaction is limited to top-down interaction between superordinate and subordinate. In 
contrast, in participative finns, a greater part of the coordination tasks is achieved 
horizontally by the workers themselves, on all levels in the firm, thereby multiplying the 
opportunities for interaction. This is also true of firms operating in dynamic environments 
characterised by high levels of uncertainty, change and innovation. However, these are 
precisely the kinds of firms that is expected to benefit most from high levels of participation. 
Therefore, PDM can be hypothesised to increase social interaction. The same can be assumed 
about financial participation, when it is true that financial participation increases workplace 
cooperation (Kruse & Blasi, 1995). 
4. The last factor identified by Nahapiet & Goshal is closure, which they define as "a sense 
of ideological boundary that distinguishes members from non-members'" (N ahapiet & 
Goshal, 1998: 258). It seems reasonable to assume that members of participative 
organisations have a stronger sense oftheir collective identity than members of more 
traditional corporations, and are consequently characterised by a higher level of closure. 
Indeed, this closure is often used as an argument by opponents of participation, who claim 
that the employees of participative corporations would neither be open to technological 
progress, nor to new workers (sic). Therefore, participation can be hypothesised to increase 
closure. 
Some of these links will be investigated in the second part of this paper. However, before we 
present that empirical investigation, we will consider some contingencies of participation that 
have lead to the definition of our survey population. 
IA. UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES IS PARTICIPATION TO BE RECOMMENDED? 
Participation is more likely to be effective in the following circumstances: 
1) When the workers have degrees of higher education or are highly trained, because 
these workers are likely to better understand operational and financial constraints and 
to come up with better suggestions to improve the efficiency of their corporation 
(Heller, 1991). 
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2) When the corporation faces a retention problem. This is particularly the case in 
sectors where the demand of labour exceeds the offer of labour. Indeed, when there is 
a shortage of labour, firms will compete in order to attract competent workers, and 
workers are more likely to switch from one company to another (so-called job-
hopping). Corporations can also face retention problems when they provide the 
workers with specific but transferable training. Both occurences are more likely 
when the workforce is highly educated, because highly educated workers have a 
higher mobility and a better understanding of the market mechanisms. In this context, 
participation can be used as an instrument to reduce turnover (Buchko, 1992). 
3) When the firm evolves in a dynamic environment. In the literature about financial 
participation, the fact that profit sharing or share ownership should be integrated in 
the company-wide human resources strategy is emphasised. Since profit sharing and 
share ownership are variable pay systems, they are particularly suited to firms 
evolving in a dynamic environment and therefore requiring a high degree of 
functional flexibility (Fe sting et aI., 1999). The kind of technology used by the firm 
and the task complexity also have an impact on the presence of financial 
participation schemes. Festing et al (1999) have found a link between job enrichment 
and financial participation. This can be explained either by the flexibility required by 
some kinds of technology and work organisation, e.g. enriched tasks or just-in-time 
operations management, or by the greater responsibility borne by the individual 
employee within particular technological and organisational settings, which increases 
the potential gains of an adequate incentive structure. 
The relationship between the size of the company (measured by the number of employees) 
and participation has often been investigated, but the literature about the impact of this 
variable is not consistent: on the one hand, the efforts of employees in small and medium-
sized enterprises are more closely linked with the company results (Kruse & Blasi, 1995), but 
on the other hand, financial participation is more likely to be found in larger companies 
(Merckx & Van Den Bulcke, 1992). The stock of these companies is often publicly traded 
and valued on stock markets, which makes the impact of share ownership more transparant to 
the workers-owners (Festing et aI., 1999); however, this is oflesser significance for profit-
sharing schemes. In addition, large companies have fully developed financial and human 
resources departments, that are more likely to introduce innovative decision-making 
procedures and reward schemes. 
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Part II: An empirical analysis of participation and social capital 
II.I. SURVEY POPULATION AND SAMPLE 
A written survey was carried out between november 1999 and february 2000. A 
questionnaire was sent to all Belgian companies employing at least 50 people and active in 
one of the following sectors: banking, insurance, computing and chemicals. 273 Companies 
were selected in this manner. 
The choice of the four sectors in which our survey has been made was guided by our 
expectation that both PDM and financial participation would be a more frequent occurrence 
in these sectors. This expectation is based on the theoretical arguments exposed above (see § 
1.4) and on the findings of previous surveys. Festing et al. (1999) report early studies in 
Germany showing that a higher level of financial participation was found in banking and 
insurance, as well as in the public utilities organizations. Another international study has 
shown that financial participation was more common in the financial, distribution and high-
tech sectors, as well as the sector of corporate services (Vaughan-Whitehead, 1995). In a 
large-scale survey done in the Belgian context, financial participation was most often 
encountered in the banking and insurance sector, in the chemical sector, the oil sector and the 
computers and software sector. (Merckx & Van Den Bulcke, 1992). These are sectors which 
are highly profitable (chemical and oil), in which the international competition is very strong 
(banking and insurance), or that employ a highly qualified workforce (computers and 
software). The reason why we did not include the oil sector in our survey is the rather limited 
number of firms operating in this sector in Belgium, especially in the light of the recent 
merger movements in this industry. 
Out ofthe 273 sent questionnaires, 62 (22.7%) were returned. These questionnaires have 
been answered by human resources managers, more than 50% of these managers being also 
members of the board of directors of their corporation. In addition, some data has been 
gathered from mm-respondents by phone. 82 companies (30.0%) collaborated to this phone 
survey. Hence we have at least some information about 52.7% of the survey popUlation. 
The proportion of respondents active in each sector approximates closely the popUlation 
distribution (see Table I). The proportion of respondents having a scheme of financial 
participation is slightly higher than (but not significantly different from) the proportion of 
phone respondents having a scheme of financial participation. The proportion of non-
respondents having such schemes is unknown. It could be somewhat lower, but there are no 
clear indications that this would be the case. On the contrary, there is a clear indication that 
small firms are under-represented in our survey sample when compared to the phone sample. 
One obvious reason is that small firms often don't have structured human resources 
departments, with the consequence that nobody feels comfortable or is ready to devote some 
time to answer a questionnaire addressed to human resources managers. 
Full population 0/0 Survey sample 0/0 
Banking 53 19.4 % 16 25.8 % 
Insurance 44 16.1 % II 17.7 % 
Computing 98 35.9% 20 32.3 % 
Chemicals 78 28.6% 15 24.2 % 
Total 273 100% 62 100% 
Table I: Survey popUlation and survey sample 
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The reader should bear the two following caveats in mind while reading this section about the 
empirical results. First, though the response rate is satisfYing and compares positively to 
response rates on other comparable surveys, the absolute number of corporations which took 
part to this survey is rather small. Consequently, statistical estimates should be considered 
with care. We will rely more upon significance and magnitudes than upon exact coefficient 
estimates. In addition, these results should not be generalised without great caution to 
corporations that were not included in the survey sample. However, this does not mean that 
the results that will be exposed here are only valid for those corporations that were included 
in the sample: the relationships that are found here are likely to be found, though not in all 
corporations, at least in other random samples generated from the same population. 
Secondly, our questionnaire has been filled only by one manager in each company. Hence the 
answers may be biased, though we do not have reasons to suspect that this would seriously 
affect the results of our analyses. In order to have the real picture of what's going on in the 
different companies surveyed, we should be able to gather some information from workers' 
representatives; this will be part of fmiher research. 
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II.2. PARTICIPATION MEASURED 
First of all, we will give an overview of the occurrence of different forms of financial 
participation and PDM within our sample. 
1l.2.]. Financial participation measured 
In the following table you can see how many respondents have one or several schemes of 
financial palticipation. Though financial participation is a slightly more frequent occurrence 
in the computing sector and a slightly less frequent occurrence in the chemicals sector, the 
differences are not statistically significant (the minimal significance level of pairwise 
comparisons measured by the Tukey method is 0.660). This means that the small number of 
respondents do not allow us to generalise the small differences found in this sample to a 
larger population. 
Banking Insurance Computing Chemicals Total 
No financial 9 6 8 10 32 
participation 
One scheme of 6 5 10 5 26 
FP 
Several I 0 2 I 4 
schemes of FP 
Total 16 II 20 15 62 
Table 2: Financial participation - Frequencies 
In the next table you can read that shares savings plans and profit-sharing schemes are the 
most frequently occuring forms of financial participation. The total number of schemes is 
irrelevant here because some companies apply several kinds of financial participation, and 
because some schemes apply to management and to other workers while other schemes apply 
only to one of these groups. It does not appear that particular schemes are preferred by 
particular groups - e.g. that stock options would be given only to top executives.5 
management white-collar and blue-collar 
free shares 2 I 
shares savings plan 9 8 
stock options 5 3 
profit sharing 16 10 
Table 3: Different schemes of financial participation - Frequencies 
In addition, we can note that 22 out of the 32 corporations without any program for financial 
participation claim that they would initiate such a program if there existed a safe regulatory 
(tax) framework. Other important reasons why some companies do not have any program for 
financial participation are a decision made by the mother company and the fact that the stock 
of the corporation is not traded on the stock exchange (sic). This last argument is somewhat 
contradicted by the observation that out of the 30 companies that have effectively set up 
financial participation, almost one half is not traded publicly neither directly nor indirectly 
(through the mother company). The risk of a declining stock market and the attitude of the 
labour unions are considerations of lesser importance. 
5 The questionnaires have been sent immediately after the publication of the law regarding stock options 
(28.10.1999). Consequently, the use of such schemes may have become more frequent since then. 
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II.2.2. PDMmeasured 
PDM has been measured as an answer to two questions. First, how much influence do the 
workers have on decisions made regarding a series of eight different issues? The eight issues 
listed in our questionnaire were: (I) job design and job description, (2) distribution of tasks 
between the members of a same functional unit, (3) work circumstances, (4) terms of 
employment, (5) simple hrm decisions, (6) strategic decisions and investments, (7) product 
development, (8) allocation of profits. Secondly, through what channels is this influence 
exercised? Eight channels were listed in our questionnaire: (1) workers' councils, (2) union 
delegates, (3) health and safety committees, (4) quality circles, (5) workers' representatives 
in the board of directors, (6) autonomous work teams, (7) other channels involving blue-
collar workers, and (8) other channels involving white-collar workers (e.g. task forces, hrm 
committees, or informal communication). Influence was measured on a 6-items scale: 
I workers have no influence at all 
2 workers receive some information, either ex ante or a posteriori 
3 workers' advice is gained before the decision is taken 
4 the decision is the output of a dialogue between management and workers 
5 workers have a veto-right concerning those decisions 
6 workers have full decision right 
Table 4: PDM measurement scale 
A grid has been set up where all the possible combinations (issue/channel) are summarised. 
In the following table, you can see the average score for each issue, through each channel 
(standard deviations between brackets). 
jobdesign and 
job description 
task assignments 
job 
circumstances 
(health, safety) 
terms of 
employment 
(salary) 
hrm 
strategic 
decisions and 
investments 
product 
development 
allocation of 
profits 
Workers' 
council 
1.48 
(0.82) 
1.36 
(0.79) 
2.10 
(1.29) 
2.09 
(1.39) 
1.50 
(0.80) 
1.55 
(0.57) 
1.43 
(0.60) 
1.26 
(0.52) 
Unions 
1.52 
(0.86) 
1.36 
(0.74) 
2.24 
(1.37) 
2.29 
(1.44) 
1.43 
(0.88) 
1.22 
(0.46) 
1.21 
(0.49) 
1.09 
(0.39) 
Health 
and safety 
committee 
1.26 
(0.69) 
1.26 
(0.66) 
2.67 
(1.39) 
1.57 
(1.11) 
1.21 
(0.59) 
1.22 
(0.46) 
1.21 
(0.52) 
1.03 
(0.18) 
Quality 
circles 
1.31 
(0.84) 
1.28 
(0.81) 
1.33 
(0.93) 
1.19 
(0.72) 
1.29 
(0.99) 
1.19 
(0.76) 
1.33 
(0.98) 
1.12 
(0.70) 
Delegate 
on the 
board 
1.17 
(0.67) 
1.17 
(0.75) 
1.25 
(0.92) 
1.25 
(0.86) 
1.15 
(0.66) 
1.34 
(1.15) 
1.24 
(0.90) 
1.22 
(0.87) 
Autono-
mous 
teams 
1.51 
(1.21) 
1.59 
(1.33) 
1.71 
(1.30) 
1.49 
(1.02) 
1.63 
(1.32) 
1.42 
( 1.07) 
1.46 
(1.10) 
1.15 
(0.55) 
Table 5: PDM per issue and per channel- Average scores 
Blue-
collar 
workers 
1.44 
(0.97) 
1.47 
(1.10) 
1.54 
(1.09) 
1.34 
(0.80) 
1.29 
(0.74) 
1.17 
(0.50) 
1.22 
(0.62) 
1.08 
(0.34) 
White-
collar 
workers 
2.24 
(1.34) 
2.42 
(1.42) 
2.36 
(1.27) 
1.90 
(1.12) 
2.03 
(1.19) 
1.47 
(0.75) 
1.64 
(0.94) 
1.17 
(0.53) 
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Though the highest score in Table 5may appear to be quite low (2.67), the reader should 
remember that a score of"O" means either that one particular channel has no influence on 
one particular topic, or that this particular channel does not exist. As the following table 
shows, some channels are present more often than others, and this does have an influence on 
the average influence exercised by each channel. 
Occurence Average influence Average (valid answers) 
White-collar workers 62 1.89 1.89 
Health and safety committee 41 1.44 1.63 
Workers' council 36 1.60 1.99 
Union delegates 34 1.55 1.96 
Autonomous teams 15 1.49 2.88 
Quality circles 11 1.25 2.34 
Blue-collar workers 106 1.31 1.76 
Representatives on the board 7 1.22 2.73 
Table 6: PDM Channels - Occurrence and average influence 
Therefore we show hereafter the same results that are shown in Table 5, but taking only the 
valid answers into account (standard deviations between brackets). 
J~::: .................... ~:.~.~.::: ..  
jobdesign and 
job description 
task assignments 
job 
circumstances 
(health, safety) 
terms of 
employment 
(salary) 
hrm 
strategic 
decisions and 
investments 
product 
development 
allocation of 
profits 
Workers' 
council 
1.83 
(0.94) 
1.64 
(0.96) 
2.86 
(1.20) 
2.75 
(1.40) 
1.81 
(0.89) 
1.89 
(0.46) 
1.69 
(0.62) 
1.42 
(0.60) 
Unions 
1.91 
(0.97) 
1.65 
(0.88) 
3.21 
(1.09) 
3.29 
(1.17) 
1.74 
(1.05) 
1.38 
(0.55) 
1.35 
(0.60) 
1.15 
(0.50) 
Health 
and safety 
committee 
1.39 
(0.80) 
1.39 
(0.77) 
3.44 
(0.98) 
1.80 
(1.25) 
1.29 
(0.68) 
1.34 
(0.53) 
1.29 
(0.60) 
1.05 
(0.22) 
Quality 
circles 
2.64 
(1.29) 
2.45 
(1.37) 
2.73 
(1.49) 
2.00 
(1.41) 
2.55 
(1.86) 
Delegate 
on the 
board 
2.29 
(1.60) 
2.43 
(1.81) 
2.71 
(1.98) 
2.86 
(1.77) 
1.86 
(1.46) 
2.00 3.86 
(1.55) (2.12) 
2.73 
(1.68) 
1.64 
( 1.57) 
3.00 
(1.91) 
2.86 
(1.95) 
Autono-
mous 
teams 
2.93 
(1.75) 
3.33 
(1.72) 
3.60 
(1.12) 
2.80 
(1.26) 
3.27 
(1.67) 
2.67 
( 1.59) 
2.80 
(1.57) 
1.60 
(0.99) 
Blue-
collar 
7 
workers 
2.00 
(1.33) 
2.50 
(1.78) 
2.30 
(1.42) 
1.80 
(1.14) 
1.60 
(0.97) 
1.40 
(0.52) 
1.50 
(0.85) 
1.00 
(0.00) 
Table 7: PDM per issue and per channel- Average valid scores 
White-
collar 
workers 
2.24 
(1.34) 
2.42 
(1.42) 
2.36 
(1.27) 
1.90 
(1.12) 
2.03 
(1.19) 
1.47 
(0.75) 
1.64 
(0.94) 
1.17 
(0.53) 
6 This figure represents only corporations active in the chemicals sector that have production facilities 
and workers in Belgium, which amounts to 10 out of the 15 corporations active in this sector. 
7 See footnote 2. 
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Looking at Table 7, we can note that on average, strategic PDM is by far the least developed 
kind of PDM, the allocation of profits being itself the issue on which workers have the least 
influence. There are, however, some exceptions: some quality circles have a significant 
impact on product development, as well as autonomous teams, and the latter have some say 
regarding hnn decisions, but on the whole workers' delegates on the board have the most 
influence on strategic issues. Moreover, PDM is most often exercised either through white-
collar workers' councils or through unions and mandatory councils, though unions' and 
workers' councils' influence does not reach farther than job circumstances and terms of 
employment. However, in most cases they have some sort of a monopoly on these issues, 
except when strong autonomous teams are active within the corporation. In a few cases, 
members of quality circles, workers' representatives in the company board and autonomous 
teams do indeed have very much decision-making power, certainly more than the unions 
have. These observations are confirmed by the average scores computed for the influence 
exercised by the different channels (see Table 6). 
There are also some differences between the four sectors: white-collar workers have the most 
influence in the computer sector and in the bank sector. In the insurance sector, there are 
more workers' delegates in the board than in any other sector, while the chemical firms have 
the most autonomous teams, which is not surprising for they are the only finns in our sample 
to have production teams. Workers' councils are important in all sectors except the computer 
sector, which may be due to the relative smaller size of these corporations.8 In order to give 
the reader more insight into the differences between sectors, we reproduce here Table 6, 
broken up on a sectoral basis (the most striking figures have been highlighted): 
Table 8: PDM Channels - average influence in the four different sectors 
It came as a surprise to us to observe that the extent to which mandatory councils allow the 
workers (or their representatives) some influence on issues like work circumstances and 
tenns of employment is one of the most volatile variables - as measured by standard 
deviations. We interpret this observation as follows: the participative culture is the primary 
factor influencing PDM, even when PDM is mandatory: participative finns will turn 
mandatory PDM, whether mandatory or voluntary, into a powerful instrument for dialogue 
between management and workers, while more autocratic finns are able to minimise the 
impact of even mandatory PDM. 
An ANOVA of the average PDM scores in the four different sectors, broken up according to 
the different issues and according to the different channels, allows us to get additional and 
8 Though there are no systematic differences between the different sectors regarding the size of the 
corporations, we assume that many software companies have known a more rapid growth than finns in 
other sectors, hence that five years ago, at the time of the last social elections, they still did not employ 
the minimal number of employees (100) that makes it mandatory to set up a workers' council. 
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more precise information.9 Institutionalised PDM (union delegates and health and safety 
committees) is much more developed in the chemicals sector than in the banking and 
computing sectors. Workers in the insurance sector have the most freedom W.r.t. jobdesign, 
while the workers in the computing sector occupy a middle position. Workers in the 
chemicals and the software sector have the most influence on task allocation, while workers 
in the banking sector have the least influence. Finally, workers in the insurance sector have 
much more influence on their terms of employment than workers in the banking sector. On 
the whole, the insurance sector allows its workers to exercise slightly more influence (on 
most issues) than the other sectors, computing sector included. It also appears that the bank 
sector is somewhat less participative (again on most issues). 
In order to distinguish between participative and non-participative firms, we have aggregated 
the figures shown in Table 5 as follows: at first, for each corporation, we have taken the 
maximum score in each row; secondly, we have computed the average of these maximum 
scores. The resulting averages are shown below in Table 9 (standard deviations between 
brackets). The rationale behind this approach is that we wanted to have some measure of the 
effective influence workers in each firm have on each particular topic; whether this influence 
is exercised through workers' councils or through delegates on the board is in this context of 
lesser importance (the information contained in Table 6 and Table 8 already allows the reader 
to make some comparison between the different channels of participation). 
Table 9: PDM - Overall average influence per issue 
Based on the scores summarised in Table 9, we conducted a cluster-analysis between the 
variables representing participation to the different issues.1O That analysis supported the a 
priori established distinction between PDM on the workfloor, PDM on social issues and 
strategic PDM by stressing, first, the links existing between the issues of work circumstances 
and terms of employment (social issues), next, the links existing between decisions 
concerning investments, products, hrm and profits (strategic issues), and finally the link 
9 The results are reproduced in Appendix I. All pairwise comparisons are reproduced when at 
least one pairwise difference reaches a significance level ofO.05. 
10 See Appendix 2. 
19 
between the issues of job design and task distribution (workfloor issues). This last link was 
the most fragile, job design being also linked with work circumstances. Based on these 
results, four indices of PDM were devised: an index for PDM on the workfloor, an index for 
PDM on social issues, an index for strategic PDM and a global PDM index. These four 
indices are simply weighted averages of the scores found in Table 5, hence they also range 
from 1 to 6, 1 being the weakest and 6 the strongest possible result. 
II.3. PARTICIPATION, WEAK AND STRONG 
As a next step after measurement, we wished to consolidate the various forms of participation 
discussed above and introduce a distinction between weak and strong forms of participatory 
arrangements. The introduction of such a distinction will undoubtedly lead to the loss of 
some information about the different participation schemes developed by the respondents. 
However, it will also allow us to aggregate the different cases and draw more general 
conclusions about participation as a business philosophy, rather than about this or that piece 
of participation legislation. Theoretically, we would like to define weak forms of 
participation as forms of participation that leave the power structure in the organisation 
unchanged. Inversely, strong forms of participation would be those that redistribute decision-
making power within the organisation. This theoretical distinction can be applied to PDM 
and to financial participation as follows. 
Theoretically, a strong PDM company would be a company of which the workers have at 
least some formal co-decision right or veto-right on any particular kind of issues, wether 
through various fora and councils, representative bodies or by direct involvement. An 
additional condition would be that PDM is not restricted to that particular issue, but extends 
to a broader range of issues. However, even if the workers of a particular company do not 
have full decision rights on any issue, there could exist a "participative culture" in that 
company. Since we do attach some importance to that culture, we would allow corporations 
with a sufficiently high average level of influence to be included within the "strongly 
participative" group. Therefore we applied the following decision rule: a company has strong 
PDM if either the workers have at least some formal co-decision right or veto-right on any 
particular kind of issues (at least two scores of 5 in Table 5) and the global PDM index is at 
least 2.75, or the global PDM index is at least 3.5 (see Table 9). 
Seven corporations satisfied the first criterion, while twelve corporations satisfied the second 
criterion (score> 3.5). This second criterion appeared to be particularly robust, since all the 
seven corporations that satisfied the first criterion also satisfied the second one. In addition, 
the global PDM index being computed as a weighted average, it is only very weakly sensitive 
to small changes in the various participation scores per issue and per channel. Hence the 
second criterion was considered as the only relevant criterion. Subsequently global PDM 
index of2.75 was taken as the criterion to define "weak" PDM. All the companies who have 
a global PDM index below 2.75 were labelled as "no PDM" (note that the overall average is 
2.71). In table 8 you can find the figures about PDM in the survey sample. Again there is no 
relationship between the strength of PDM and the sectors in which the corporations are 
active. 
frequencies percent 
no PDM (x < 2.75) 28 45.2% 
weak PDM (2.75 < x < 3.5) 22 35.4% 
strong PDM (x > 3.5) 12 19.4% 
Table 10: Weak and strong PDM - Frequencies 
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One could argue that ifthe criterion used to distinguish between weak and strong forms of 
PDM is the extent to which different schemes of PDM lead to an effective redistribution of 
power, then strategic PDM would by nature be a stronger form ofPDM than PDM on social 
issues, which would in turn be stronger than workfloor PDM, since these three kinds ofPDM 
involve sharing power at different levels in the organisation, that are hierarchically 
subordinated to each other. Hence the question could be raised wether the various aspects of 
PDM on the workfloor, PDM on social issues and strategic PDM should not be weighted 
differently when computing our "global PDM index". There are two reasons why we have 
chosen to compute an unweighted index. 
The first one is that all three kinds of participation are required for a genuine "participative 
culture" to be developped. This argument has been a posteriori supported by the data: the 
PDM scores to the eight issues are highly and almost equally correlated with each other,just 
as the scores for the three kinds of PDM (see Table 11). This tends to indicate that there 
exists something like a "participative culture".11 The somewhat stronger correlation between 
PDM on the workfloor and strategic PDM provides additional support for the "participative 
culture" argument, since these two types of participation are voluntary and are therefore 
better indicators of the "culture" of the organisation than the existence of mandatory 
participation schemes. 
PDM: Workfloor Social issues Strategic 
Workfloor 1 
Social issues 0.509* 1 
Strategic 0.579* 0.503* 1 
* correlation significant at the 0.01 level 
Table 11: Correlations between different types ofPDM 
Mean score: 
3.06 
3.48 
2.33 
The second reason is that all three kinds ofPDM can be assumed to have a significant 
influence on the development of the different components of social capital. Both strategic 
PDM and a harmonious PDM on social issues are antecedents of a trust climate within the 
company, while workfloor PDM may be more important to enhance communication, since it 
involves (at least potentially) all workers, while PDM on both strategic and social issues is 
most often exercised through workers' representatives. In addition, all three kinds ofPDM 
can be assumed to be conducive to the development of a shared vision. A tentative test of this 
assumption will be addressed in § 11.4. 
Another question concerns the number of workers involved with those different PDM 
initiatives. Just as in the case of financial participation, we would expect a participative 
culture to develop only when a large majority of workers is involved. Unfortunately, it was 
not possible to investigate this with our data, because most kinds of formal PDM are indirect, 
i.e. involving workers' representatives, either voluntary or elected. Therefore, it was not 
possible to draw any clear conclusion about the number of workers involved. 
Unlike PDM,jinanciai participation is not an obvious instrument to redistribute power 
within an organisation. However, we think that some kinds of financial participation can 
support mechanisms of power redistribution, while other kinds of financial participation can 
be a hindrance to those mechanisms. Theoretically, capital participation can support power 
redistribution mechanisms through the voting power associated with share ownership. 
II This observation provides also a posteriori support for the criterion used to distinguish weak and 
strong forms ofPDM: what counts is rather the broader picture than the scores on one particular issue. 
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Nevertheless we think that individual share ownership has to be mediated by a workers' 
cooperative or some other analogous body for this share ownership to be meaningful, since 
the vote of individual workers will have virtually no incidence on decisions taken at thc 
general meetings (though the ownership of one single sharc may be enough to submit proxy 
resolutions). However, taking the unfavourable Belgian context into account, we consider 
any initiative taken to develop capital participation to be a sufficient indication of the 
participation-mindedness of management, provided that this initiative extends to all the 
workers, and not only to managers or top employees. For the same reason, we consider 
company-wide schemes of profit-sharing to all workers, based on collective performance 
indicators, to be strong forms of financial participation. Though such kinds of profit sharing 
cannot be said to suppOli directly power redistribution, they can be said to encourage 
individual initiative and responsibility, and also cooperation between individuals in order to 
enhance collective performance. In other words, they supp0l1 the development of an 
ownership culture, and of social capital. 
Therefore we applied the following decision rule: a company has strong financial 
participation either if capital participation extends to all workers, or if profit sharing based 
on collective performance indicators extends to all workers. The results are shown in Table 
10. These results are not broken down according to sectors, because there are no significant 
differences. 
frequencies percent 
no fp 32 51.6 % 
weak fp 17 27.4 % 
strong fp 13 21.0 % 
Table 12: Financial participation - Frequencies 
It is noteworthy that there is a significant positive correlation (Pearson correlation 0.341, 
significant at the 0.01 level) between the size of the workforce and the presence of 
respectively no, weak or strong financial participation. This indicates that financial 
participation schemes are a significantly more frequent occurrence in larger firms than in 
smaller firms. There is no similar linear relationship between the size of the workforce and 
the global PDM index. Further, there is no linear relationship (Pearson correlation -0.074, 
significant at the 0.582 level) between PDM and financial participation. This may be due to 
the weak linearity of indicators comprising only three values: no/weak/strong. However, 
there is nonetheless a clear non-linear relationship between PDM and financial participation: 
while "no PDM' seems to be related with "no financial participation", there seems to be a 
"trade-off' between strong PDM and strongfinancial participation; indeed, there are only 
two corporations with both strong PDM and strong financial participation, while 13 
corporations have either strong PDM and weak financial participation or strong financial 
participation and weak PDM. 
noPDM weakPDM strong PDM 
no fp 16 11 4 
weak fp 7 4 6 
strong fp 4 7 2 
Table 13: Cross-table between financial participation and PDM 
There is a paradox here, because the respondents claim not to consider financial participation 
and PDM as substitutes. We don't have a ready answer to that paradox, but it may be more 
important to understand why strong financial participation and strong PDM could be 
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substitutes. One element of the answer has already been given above: strategic participation 
and strong financial (capital) participation are de Jacto two different ways to achieve one 
same result: to involve the workers to the strategic evolution of the corporation. Hence it is 
not necessary to have both strong financial participation and strong PDM; however, it is 
definitely necessary to have some PDM in order to complement strong financial 
participation, and vice-versa. 
II.4. PARTICIPATION AND SOCIAL CAPITAL 
We asked our respondents to indicate the objectives of their human resources policy. They 
indicated several objectives: good relationships between management and workers, 
commitment, productivity and trust. But whichever objective has the priority, it appears from 
our data that social capital is - according to those human resources managers - the first key to 
the development of a corporation's human resources. Indeed, a good atmosphere and 
teamwork are the two things that contribute the most to the corporations' objectives 
regarding human resources management, out of a list of 25 items 12 . Work atmosphere and 
teamwork are closely related with social capital because they are necessary conditions for 
successful co-operation, while social capital is essentially a measure of the potential for 
successful co-operation: "In organizations strong in social capital, mutual commitment is 
characteristic of ( ... ) relationships among organizational members." (Leana & Van Buren, 
1998: 549). 
These two factors are followed immediately by variables representing "intellectual capital": 
continuous learning, and highly educated workers. Fifth comes the autonomy granted to 
workers, which is essential to the development of "participative culture". An element like 
"salary", though it is acknowledged to be important by most respondents, lags significantly 
behind, and does appear less important than the quality of the relationship one has with his 
hierarchical superior. 
Mean score Std. deviation Key: 
Work atmosphere 1.77 0.76 
Teamwork 1.90 
Continuous learning 1.92 
0.93 
0.89 
1: very high importance 
2: high importance 
Hil!;h education 2.03 
Autonomy at work 2.06 
Relations with superior 2.12 
Sall!!Y 2.15 
0.97 
0.81 
0.83 
0.79 
3: average importance 
4: very little importance 
5: no importance at all 
Table 14: Most important factors of a successful human resources management 
(extracts from a list of 25 items) 
In addition, the genuine importance of teamwork is supported by the difference between the 
mean scores of two other indicators: though human resources managers deem it important to 
follow up individual workers closely, it is significantly less important for them to measure 
individual performance (means are 2.32 and 2.56, difference significant at the 0.05 level). 
A central question in this paper is whether participation is a suited means to realising the 
objectives ofthe respondents' human resources management policy. Since social capital 
appears essential to realising these objectives, it seems justified to devote particular attention 
to the link(s) existing between participation and social capital. The theoretical links have 
already been exposed in section IA. 
12 See appendix 3. 
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Empirically, the link between participation and social capital is also emphasised by the 
respondents. A list of 42 items in which participation could have a positive influence was 
submitted to them l3 , and they had to rate the importance of these 42 items. They consider 
participation (financial participation and/or POM) to be primarily a means to: 
• stress the importance of corporate objectives, 
• enhance the development of a trust climate, 
• increase workers' motivation. 
Those three items are clearly linked with the trust and shared vision components of social 
capital. Three other items which participation can help to develop are dialogue and 
communication, both top-down and bottom-up. Though communication is not a component 
of social capital stricto sensu, it can be viewed both as a sign of a dense network 
configuration and as an antecedent of the development of a shared vision. 
Mean Std. Dev. Key: 
stress the importance of corporate 1.37 0.56 
obiectives 
enhance the development of a 1.58 
trust climate 
0.75 1: very high importance 
2: high importance 
increase workers' motivation 1.60 0.77 
dialogue 1.74 0.68 
top-down communication 1.87 0.96 
bottom-up communication 1.90 0.87 
Table 15: Most important expected effects of participation 
3: average importance 
4: very little importance 
5: no importance at all 
(extracts from a list of 42 items; the 36 other items have mean scores 
ranging from 1.71 to 4.10 (standard deviations ranging from 0.76 to 1.44). 
Hence, we have both theoretical and empirical reasons to assume the existence of several 
links between participation and social capital. In order to investigate these links empirically, 
we have to design a scale to measure social capital, or at least the three following 
components: communication, trust and shared vision. 
The structural component of social capital is very difficult to assess when there is only one 
respondent per corporation, hence it was not measured. However we have asked three 
questions about communication: "To what extent are the objectives regarding top-down 
communication / bottom-up communication / dialogue realised within the corporation?" The 
scale composed of those three indicators, though it provides only an imperfect approximation 
of the real quality of communication within the corporation, has a high reliability 
(Cronbach's alpha for standardised variables 0.838). Hence is was deemed appropriate as a 
proxy for "communication". 
Five questions were asked about the perception of trust: "How good is the trust climate 
within your corporation?", "How good is the trust management has in workers?", "How good 
is the trust workers have in management?", "How opportunistic is the management?", "How 
opportunistic are the workers?" It appeared that managers were (in their own perception) 
more enclined to trust workers than vice-versa, because the management was also perceived 
(by a human resources managers who was often himself a member ofthe board of directors) 
as being more opportunistic. Further, the "trust climate" appeared to reflect an almost exact 
average between the trust workers have in management on the one hand, and the trust 
management has in workers on the other hand. Therefore, and because both kinds of trust are 
13 See appendix 4. 
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impOliant for the development of participation, the answer to that one question "How good is 
the trust climate within your corporation?" was taken as the single measure of trust within the 
corporation. 
No question has been asked explicitly about the existence of a shared vision. However, three 
questions allow us to evaluate the existence of a shared commitment, which may be related to 
such a shared vision: "To what extent is the workers' interest linked with the corporation's 
objectives?", "To what extent are the workers committed and loyal towards the corporation?" 
and "To what extent do the workers have a good understanding and a feeling of responsibility 
for financial issues?". The scale aggregating the answers to these three questions has a 
moderate reliability (Cronbach's alpha for standardised variables 0.743) that is nonetheless 
sufficient at this stage. Hence it was used as a measure of the existence of a "shared vision". 
It has been said above that participation was seen by the respondents primarily as a means to 
stress the importance of corporate objectives, enhance the development of a trust climate, and 
increase workers' motivation. In addition, there are two other issues managers want to 
improve with participation: on the one hand operational productivity, and on the other hand 
innovation, information exchange, individual responsibility, creativity, self-development and 
quality of work life. Innovation and information exchange are clearly related with intellectual 
capital, but individual responsibility and self-development are characteristic of what one 
would call the "ownership culture" which is often assumed to develop within participative 
firms. A reliability analysis provides us with a very highly reliable scale (Cronbach's alpha 
for standardised items: 0.961) comprising the following three items: "the extent to which 
workers have room for personal responsibility", "the extent to which workers have room for 
personal input", and "the extent to which workers have opportunities to develop themselves". 
When these three items are combined with "the extent to which workers understand and feel 
responsible for operational issues" and "the extent to which workers understand and feel 
responsible for financial issues", we have a scale comprising five items with a moderate 
reliability (0.826) but which is possibly a better index for the "ownership culture". One 
indicator included in this scale is also included in the "shared vision" scale, hence in the 
"social capital scale". Consequently we must be cautious about making inferences between 
these two constructs. However, this should not surprise us these two concept cover partly the 
same reality, i.e. the extent to which workers are committed to their corporation's objectives. 
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II. 4.1. Participation and trust 
The global PDM index is quite significantly correlated with the trust climate within the 
corporation (pearson correlation -0.267, significant at the 0.039 level). For illustrative 
purpose only, we show below the relationship between the trust climate and the weak vs. 
strong PDM index. 
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Trust axis: 1 = very good trust climate, 2 = good trust climate, 3 = neutral trust climate 
Graph 1: Relationship between PDM and trust 
When the separate influence of the different kinds ofPDM is taken into account, it appears 
that strategic PDM, though it is the least developed form ofPDM, is the most closely linked 
with trust within the corporation. This link is even the only one significant at the 0.05 level. 
PDM - workfloor PDM - social issues Strategic PDM 
Pearson correlation -0.143 -0.078 -0.287 
with trust climate 
Significance level 0.284 0.561 0.029 
Table 16: Correlation between trust and different kinds ofPDM 14 
This is surprising at first glance only. Indeed, if workers do have real decision-making power 
regarding workfloor decisions, but can exert no influence on strategic decisions, that means 
that their decision-making power is real only in the short term, since in the longer run 
changing strategic orientations may lead the management to restrict workers' opportunities to 
participate even to lesser kinds of decisions. The possibility of reverse causality (trust leading 
to participation) seems unlikely, for the link between strategic PDM and the trust workers put 
in managers is much stronger than the link between strategic PDM and the trust managers put 
in workers, while strategic PDM is a decision that can only be taken by the management. 
global trust climate trust in workers trust in managers 
Pearson correlation -0.287 -0.263 -0.356 
with strategic PDM 
Significance level 0.029 0.046 0.006 
Table 17: Correlation between strategic PDM and different kinds of trust 
14 These PDM indices were computed according to the methodology explained in § II.2.2. 
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The relationship between financial participation and trust is more complex: though at first 
glance it is similar to the relationship between trust and PDM (see Graph 2), there is no 
significant linear relationship between both variables (pearson correlation -0.108, significant 
at the 0.410 level). 
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Financial Participation Axis: 0 = no FP, 1 = weak FP, 2 = strong FP 
Trust axis: 1 = very good trust climate, 2 = good trust climate, 3 = neutral trust climate 
Graph 2: Relationship between financial participation and trust 
An explanation for this lack of significance is found when Graph 2 is inverted and trust is put 
on the horizontal axis (see Graph 3). There is a clear and significant difference (Tukey test 
significant at the 0.016 level) between the level of financial participation achieved when the 
trust climate is very good viz. good, but the financial participation index increases again 
when the trust climate goes from "good" to "neutral". This increase is not really significant 
(Tukey test significant at the 0.290 level) but large enough to prevent any statistically 
significant linear relationship between financial participation and trust. 
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Graph 3: Relationship between trust and financial participation 
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This bend, though not statistically significant, can be interpreted as follows: though in most 
corporations financial participation is associated with a good trust climate, in a few 
companies the management uses financial participation as an instrument to curb opportunism. 
However, it is allowed to doubt wether this is a good strategy or not, since financial 
participation schemes that are not designed with the greatest care may cause new problems of 
opportunistic behaviour (see § 1.3). 
When we try to combine both results, we need to consider again the important links existing 
between strong financial participation and PDM. As we have defined it, strong financial 
participation is either capital participation, or profit sharing based on collective performance 
indicators, both being extended to all workers. First, these kinds of financial participation 
cannot be applied without the shareholders' support. Hence the continuity of such 
participation schemes depends not only upon a management team that can be removed at will 
by the shareholders. On the contrary, the shareholders themselves warrant the continuity of 
such participation schemes, at least as long as they do not consider these schemes to 
jeopardize future profit expectations, which usually they do not. Secondly, when strong 
financial participation involves (encouraging) share ownership, which is true in 12 out ofthe 
13 cases in the survey sample, it involves a possibility for workers to influence strategic 
decisions which is protected by the law, as are the rights of any shareholder. This being said, 
it is not a surprise that different levels of trust are most closely linked with a combined index 
of PDM and financial participation instead of either the one or the other taken separately (See 
Graph 4). 
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Graph 4: Relationship between participation (PDM & FP) and trust 
A quick look at this graph should allow the reader to notice that there is a large difference 
between the participation index of "high-trust" firms on the one hand and the index of 
"medium-trust" or "low-trust" firms on the other hand. Table 18 provides the absolute mean 
difference in trust between firms with different levels of participation (significance level 
computed with the Tukey test for pairwise comparisons between brackets). 
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No participation Weak participation Stron~participation 
No participation 0(0) 
Weak participation 0.06 (0.950) 0(0) 
Strong participation 0.53 (0.057) 0.47 (0.032) 0(0) 
Table 18: Trust in weak and strong participatory firms 
The kink in Graph 4 can be interpreted as indicating that trust and participation have some 
features of "all-or-nothing" phenomena. 
On the one hand, this "all-or-nothing" characteristic can be explained very easily when it is 
assumed to originate in employees' sense of what "real" participation and "real" decision-
making power-sharing mean. Real participation would lead to high levels of trust, while all 
other forms of participation would not lead trust to increase. When a corporation is not 
participative at all, distrust will quickly take ground. and this distrust, or lack of trust, will be 
very difficult to change into a more positive attitude unless sweeping changes are made by 
the management. When the management initiates some participation, the feelings are mixed: 
some workers will feel happy that the management takes some steps towards redistributing 
power and their trust will grow. However, other workers may be aware of the fact that they 
have not gained real power and fear an opportunistic move by the management. Their trust in 
managers will tend to decline. On balance, when the management initiates moderate forms of 
participation, the effect on trust may be nihil. But when the management decides to achieve a 
real power redistribution in favour of the workers, the workers will immediately perceive this 
move as a lasting one and fears of opportunism will vanish, allowing trust to reach higher 
levels. 
On the other hand, this "all-or-nothing" characteristic contrasts with typologies oftrust 
developed in the literature. Indeed several authors distinguish several forms oftrust, e.g. 
calculative trust, knowledge-based trust and identification-based trust. These different forms 
oftrust are meant to reflect a progression from weaker to stronger forms oftrust. Our data 
tend to suggest that this "progression" is not a smooth one, but on the contrary that there 
would be a "break-point" that could possibly lie somewhere between "calculative" trust and 
"identification-based" trust. 
Eventually, though participation and trust appear to be closely related, it is obvious that they 
are separate constructs: participation is not necessary to achieve a good trust climate (see 
Table 19 and Table 20). 
weak + strong PDM noPDM ratio 
(very) good trust 26 17 1.53 
climate 
neutral trust 7 10 0.7 
climate 
Table 19: PDM in high-trust and low-trust firms 
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weak + strong financial no financial ratio 
participation participation 
(very) good trust 21 22 0.95 
climate 
neutral trust 9 8 1.13 
climate 
Table 20: Financial participation in high-trust and low-trust firms 
However, the contrary is not true regarding PDM: very few (strongly) participative firms (in 
the PDM sense) report a weak trust climate. 
(very) good neutral ratio 
trust climate trust climate 
NoPDM 17 10 1.7 
weakPDM 16 5 3.2 
strongPDM 10 2 5 
Table 21: Trust in participative firms and non-participative firms 
As could be expected from Graph 2, this last result does not hold for financial participation: 
weak and strong financial participation are found within firms with a high-trust as well as a 
low-trust profile. 
II 4.2. Participation and shared vision 
There is a significant linear relationship between PDM and our "shared vision" construct 
(pearson correlation -0.309, significant at the 0.029 level). When PDM is broken down into 
strategic PDM, PDM on social issues and PDM on the workfloor, it appears again that 
strategic PDM is the most strongly correlated with shared vision. But though there is a very 
small similar linear relationship between shared vision and financial participation, it is not 
significant at all. 
114.3. Participation and communication 
There is an even stronger linear relationship between PDM and our "communication" 
construct (pearson correlation -0.418, significant at the 0.002 level). Communication is 
significantly correlated with all three kinds ofPDM. However, there is not the slightest 
relationship between communication and financial participation. 
114.4. Participation and social capital 
The "social capital" scale was composed ofthe three items mentioned above: the trust 
indicator, the communication construct and the shared vision construct. The reliability of this 
construct (Cronbach's alpha for standardised variables) is 0.796, which is lower than the 
reliability of the construct composed of the 7 individual indicators used to build the trust, 
shared vision and communication sub-constructs (0.867). However, the reliability of a 
construct being quite dependent on the number of indicators used, a construct with a 
somewhat lower reliability but 3 items instead of7 items was deemed preferable. 
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Trust Comm unication Shared vision 
Trust I 
Communication 0.517* I 
Shared vision 0.581 * 0.600* I 
* correlation significant at the 0.00 I level 
Table 22: Pearson correlations between components of the social capital construct 
The correlation between the global PDM index, financial participation and social capital 
were computed with a structural equations model in order to account for the internal variation 
of the social capital construct. Several models were used to estimate the correlation between 
the global PDM index and social capital. The estimates ranged consistently from -0.456 to -
0.488, with a 0.05 significance level. Unsurprisingly, given our previous results, no 
significant correlation was found between financial participation and social capital. 
11.4.5. Participation and ownership culture 
The "ownership culture" construct was composed of the answers on the following questions: 
"To what extent do the workers understand and feel responsible for operational! financial 
issues?", "To what extent do the workers have room for personal responsibility! input?" and 
"To what extent do the workers have opportunities for self-development?" (Cronbach's alpha 
for standardised variables 0.8260) There is a strong and significant linear relationship 
(Pearson correlation -0.359, significant at the 0.05 level) between PDM and our "ownership 
culture" construct, but again no relationship between this construct and financial 
participation. 
Conclusions 
Based on these observations, and bearing in mind the caveats formulated in § II.l, we can 
draw the following tentative conclusions from our empirical survey: 
I. A surprising result is that PDM seems far more effective to the respondents than financial 
participation. Financial participation is hardly related to trust, nor to any other component of 
social capital. 
One first explanation is that this is due to our very crude index of financial participation, 
which can only take three values: no financial participation, weak financial participation and 
strong financial participation. This measurement problem is compounded with the small 
number of firms that actually have far-reaching forms of financial participation. That small 
number makes it almost unthinkable to get statistically significant results about financial 
participation. Though this measurement problem does certainly have some relevance, other 
elements allow us to draw different conclusions. 
A second explanation is that though financial participation does not appear to have a 
significant impact on any organisational variable, strong financial participation is intimately 
linked with strategic PDM. Strategic PDM is clearly related with the other variables we have 
studied, namely social capital and its components. This would support the claim that financial 
participation can support the development of social capital, but is not sufficient to initiate this 
development on a "stand-alone" basis. This claim is perfectly in line with the latest results 
from other empirical research about employee participation. 
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Thirdly, our respondents were asked to indicate what they thought were important 
consequences of participation. We noticed in their answers that items that are typically linked 
with financial participation (tax-friendly compensation, flexible compensation, savings, 
anchor the corporation geographically) score significantly worse than items that are typically 
linked with PDM, e.g. information exchange, self-development, creativity and quality of life 
at work. This tends to indicate that our respondents perceive financial participation as a 
weaker human resource management instrument than PDM. 
2. The relationship between PDM and trust is asymmetric: while high-trust firms do not 
necessarily have PDM schemes, almost all firms which have strong PDM schemes are high-
trust firms. The exact direction of causality is a delicate issue: does PDM improve trust or 
does trust lead the management to consider the introduction ofPDM? Though, some data 
suggest that PDM helps to improve the trust climate. 
3. PDM on the workfloor may have a greater influence on workfloor productivity than other 
forms of PDM, and strategic PDM may have a greater influence on trust than other forms of 
PDM, while a honest application of mandatory participation is also necessary to develop 
good communication. In any case, these three forms ofPDM should not be considered 
separately: our data show that they are very much related to each other, and that all three are 
required in order to develop organisational social capital. 
4. There are two main ways to increase trust within the organisation: first, by developing 
PDM, and second, by developing communication. This is consistent with the literature about 
trust. PDM amounts to sharing power, and this power sharing may help to reduce the 
uncertainty and vulnerability of the weaker party, i.e. the workers. PDM will indeed allow the 
workers to control opportunistic managerial behaviour, which is an important factor of 
distrust between managers and workers. Communication is also acknowledged to be a 
necessary condition to build identification-based trust, which is the strongest form of trust. 
Obviously, PDM and communication fit perfectly well with each other, but we would like to 
stress one more time that all three different forms ofPDM are required to develop 
commmunication at all levels of the organisation. 
5. Trust has some characteristics of an "all-or-nothing" phenomenon. Hence we can deliver 
the following clear message to managers: if one wants to improve the trust climate in one's 
corporation through increased participation, whether financial or PDM, one should not be 
afraid to initiate significant "real" changes in one's organisation. 
Directions for further research 
Primo, in order to have a better picture of the relationships between social capital, financial 
participation and PDM, we should be able to gather some information from workers' 
representatives. Secunda, we have used in this paper a very crude categorical index of 
financial participation. A more refined measure instrument would without doubt allow us to 
make more refined computations and analyses. Tertia, we would like to study the potential 
links between social capital, ownership culture, and financial data about our respondents. 
However, in order to do so, we need to design an adequate indicator of financial 
performance. Those three points will guide our endeavours in the near future. 
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Appendix 1: ANOVA Tables 
Worcou: work councils 
Unidel: union delegates 
Heasaf: health and safety committee 
Quacir: quality circles 
Repboa: representatives on the board 
Auttea: autonomous teams 
Blucol: blue-collar workers 
Whicol: white-collar workers 
Sectors: 1: Banking 
2: Insurance 
3: Computing 
4: Chemicals 
ANOVA 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Between Groups 2,075 
Within Groups 20,565 
Total 22,640 
Between Groups 5,444 
Within Groups 17,781 
Total 23,225 
Between Groups 1,769 
Within Groups 11,618 
Total 13,387 
Between Groups ,666 
Within Groups 28,864 
Total 29,530 
Between Groups ,725 
Within Groups 29,724 
Total 30,449 
Between Groups 3,044 
Within Groups 50,353 
Total 53,397 
Between Groups 1,574 
Within Groups 25,504 
Total 27,078 
Between Groups ,515 
Within Groups 45,394 
Total 45909 
3 
55 
58 
3 
55 
58 
3 
55 
58 
3 
54 
57 
3 
56 
59 
3 
56 
59 
3 
56 
59 
3 
56 
59 
Jobdes: job design 
Tasass: task assignment 
Jobcir: job circumstances 
Teremp: terms of employment 
Hrm: human resources management 
Invstra: investements and strategic decisions 
Prodev: product development 
Allpro: allocation of profits 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
,692 1,850 ,149 
,374 
1,815 5,613 ,002 
,323 
,590 2,792 ,049 
,211 
,222 ,415 ,743 
,535 
,242 ,455 ,715 
,531 
1,015 1,128 ,345 
,899 
,525 1,152 ,336 
,455 
,172 ,212 ,888 
,811 
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Multiple Comparisons 
Tukey HSD 
.Mean 95% Confidence Interval 
Difference Lower Upper 
Dependent Variable (I) sector (J) sector (I-J) Std. Error Sig. Bound Bound 
unidel 1 2 -,3074 ,2266 ,532 -,90n ,2930 
3 ,1103 ,1950 ,942 -,4064 ,6270 
4 -,6490' ,2014 ,011 -1,1827 -,1154 
2 1 ,3074 ,2266 ,532 -,2930 ,90n 
3 ,4176 ,2266 ,265 -,1827 1,0180 
4 -,3417 ,2321 ,461 -,9567 ,2733 
3 1 
-,1103 ,1950 ,942 -,6270 ,4064 
2 -,4176 ,2266 ,265 -1,0180 ,1827 
4 -,7593* ,2014 ,002 -1,2930 -,2257 
4 1 ,6490' ,2014 ,011 ,1154 1,1827 
2 ,3417 ,2321 ,461 -,2733 ,9567 
3 ,7593* ,2014 ,002 ,2257 1,2930 
heasaf 1 2 -3,6765E-03 ,1832 1,000 -,4889 ,4816 
3 ,2132 ,1576 ,534 -,2044 ,6309 
4 -,2578 ,1628 ,396 -,6892 ,1735 
2 1 3,676E-03 ,1832 1,000 -,4816 ,4889 
3 ,2169 ,1832 ,639 -,2684 ,7022 
4 -,2542 ,1876 ,533 -,7513 ,2429 
3 1 -,2132 ,1576 ,534 -,6309 ,2044 
2 -,2169 ,1832 ,639 -,7022 ,2684 
4 -,4711' ,1628 ,027 -,9024 -3,97E-02 
4 1 ,2578 ,1628 ,396 -,1735 ,6892 
2 ,2542 ,1876 ,533 -,2429 ,7513 
3 4711* 1628 ,027 3973E-02 9024 
*, The mean difference is significant at the. 05 level. 
ANOVA 
Sum of Mean 
Squares df Square F Sig. 
jobdes Between Groups 19,048 3 6,349 4,707 ,005 
Within Groups 75,535 56 1,349 
Total 94,583 59 
tasass Between Groups 20,391 3 6,797 3,748 ,016 
Within Groups 101,542 56 1,813 
Total 121,933 59 
jobcir Between Groups 5,787 3 1,929 1,945 ,133 
Within Groups 55,546 56 ,992 
Total 61,333 59 
teremp Between Groups 11,487 3 3,829 2,757 ,051 
Within Groups n,763 56 1,389 
Total 89,250 59 
hrm Between Groups 10,841 3 3,614 1,825 ,153 
Within Groups 110,892 56 1,980 
Total 121,733 59 
invstra Between Groups 10,572 3 3,524 2,022 ,121 
Within Groups 97,611 56 1,743 
Total 108,183 59 
prodev Between Groups 3,876 3 1,292 ,703 ,554 
Within Groups 102,974 56 1,839 
Total 106,850 59 
allpro Between Groups 6,101 3 2,034 1,537 ,215 
Within Groups 74,082 56 1,323 
Total 80183 59 36 
Multiple Comparisons 
Tukey HSD 
. Mean 95% Confidence Interval 
Difference Lower Upper 
Dependent Variable (I) sector (J) sector (I-J) Std. Error Sig. Bound Bound 
jobdes 1 2 -1,63' ,46 ,005 -2,85 -,40 
3 -,86 ,39 ,137 -1,90 ,18 
4 -,33 ,41 ,854 -1,42 ,76 
2 1 1,63* ,46 ,005 ,40 2,85 
3 ,77 ,46 ,347 -,45 1,98 
4 1,30* ,47 ,040 4,45E-02 2,56 
3 1 ,86 ,39 ,137 -,18 1,90 
2 -,77 ,46 ,347 -1,98 ,45 
4 ,53 ,41 ,558 -,54 1,61 
4 1 ,33 ,41 ,854 -,76 1,42 
2 -1,30' ,47 ,040 -2,56 -4,45E-02 
3 -,53 ,41 ,558 -1,61 ,54 
tasass 1 2 -1,08 ,54 ,194 -2,50 ,34 
3 -1,33* ,46 ,026 -2,53 -,12 
4 -1,35* ,48 ,032 -2,61 -8,59E-02 
2 1 1,08 ,54 ,194 -,34 2,50 
3 -,24 ,53 ,967 -1,65 1,16 
4 -,27 ,55 ,962 -1,72 1,19 
3 1 1,33* ,46 ,026 ,12 2,53 
2 ,24 ,53 ,967 -1,16 1,65 
4 -2,22E-02 ,47 1,000 -1,27 1,22 
4 1 1,35* ,48 ,032 8,59E-02 2,61 
2 ,27 ,55 ,962 -1,19 1,72 
3 2,22E-02 ,47 1,000 -1,22 1,27 
teremp 1 2 -1,29* ,47 ,038 -2,54 -5,06E-02 
3 -,46 ,40 ,657 -1,52 ,59 
4 -,76 ,42 ,274 -1,87 ,34 
2 1 1,29* ,47 ,038 5,06E-02 2,54 
3 ,83 ,46 ,287 -,40 2,06 
4 ,53 ,48 ,686 -,74 1,81 
3 1 ,46 ,40 ,657 -,59 1,52 
2 -,83 ,46 ,287 -2,06 ,40 
4 -,30 ,41 ,885 -1,39 ,79 
4 1 ,76 ,42 ,274 -,34 1,87 
2 -,53 ,48 ,686 -1,81 ,74 
3 .30 .41 885 - 79 139 
*. The mean difference is significant at the .05 level. 
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Appendix 2: Cluster analysis 
A confirmatory cluster analysis was performed in order to check the distinction between 
three broad categories of PDM, and the allocation of the 8 issues to wh ich workers can 
participate into these three categories. 
The cluster analysis was performed with the Hierarchical Cluster Analsysis procedure (SPSS) 
using the "between-groups linkage" method. The squared euclidian distance was taken as 
measure of the distance between the different observations. The data were neither rescaled 
nor standardised because they were all measured on the same scale. The agglomeration 
schedule is reproduced below. 
Cluster Combined 
Stage Cluster 1 Cluster 2 
1 3 4 
2 6 7 
3 1 3 
4 5 6 
5 I 2 
6 5 8 
7 I 5 
* Index of the distance between the two clusters joined 
I: job design 
2: task assignment 
3: work circumstances 
4: terms of employment 
5: hrm 
6: strategic & investments 
7: product development 
8: allocation of profits 
Coefficients* 
63.00 
88.00 
89.50 
106.00 
133.33 
143.00 
184.25 
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Appendix 3: factors of a successful human resources management 
25 items were submitted to the respondents. For each item, they were asked to indicate how 
imp0l1ant was its contribution to a successful human resources management. The items are 
reproduced here in the same order as they appeared in the questionnaire. 
1. stable employment 
2. good atmosphere between colleagues 
3. varied tasks 
4. measure individual performance 
5. polyvalent workers 
6. challengiflgjobs 
7. individualised rewards policy 
8. employment growth 
9. clear task description 
IO.good internal promotion opportunities 
I 1. fine physical work circumstances 
12.relaxed relationships with one's superordinate 
13.few hierarchical levels 
14.teamwork 
I 5. pro-active health and safety policy 
16.jobs with responsibility and autonomy 
I7.reasonable salary span 
I8.hiring highly qualified workers 
19.close individual monitoring 
20.flexible work schedules 
2I.competitive salary 
22.hold work pressure under control 
23. permanent education 
24.long-term employment 
25.number of holidays 
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Appendix 4: effects of participation 
42 items were submitted to the respondents. For each item, they were asked to indicate to 
what extent participation - either financial participation or PDM - could contribute to that 
particular item, and to what extent the corresponding goal was already realised within their 
corporation. The items are reproduced here in the same order as they appeared in the 
questionnaire. 
1. to realise a democratic ideal of the top-management 
2. to realise the own conception of justice of the top-management 
3. to wake up the workers' interest for the corporation's goals 
4. to teach the workers to understand and be responsible for operational issues 
5. to teach the workers to understand and be responsible for financial issues 
6. to increase workers' commitment, loyalty and motivation 
7. to support better bottom-up communication 
8. to support and encourage two-ways wommunication between workers and management 
9. to teach new skills to the workers 
10.to create a climate of trust within the corporation 
11. to increase productivity 
12.to respond to unions' demands 
13. to attract excellent applicants 
14. to lower the workers' turnover 
15.to limit unions' power and attractiveness 
16.to support teamwork and team spirit 
17. to restore productivity after a downsizing 
18.to guarantee the corporation's continuity 
19.to deal with the complexity within and outside the corporation 
20.to improve innovation 
21.to improve the industrial relations (less strikes, etc.) 
22.to lower monitoring costs (to replace middle management by peer review, self-control, ... ) 
23.to direct workers' attention on the long run 
24. to support the implementation of a new production system 
25.to improve workers' job satisfaction 
26.to raise profits through an improved commitment 
27.to find complementary sources of finance 
28.to protect one's company against take-overs 
29.to increase rewards' flexibility 
30.to encourage collective saving 
31. to anchor the corporation in its local environment 
32.to reward the workers in a tax-friendly way 
33.to compensate for the absence of co-decision opportunities 
34.to develop a private pension scheme 
35.to link workers' effort with the corporation's profits 
36.to facilitate a sweeping organisational change 
37.to optimise information and knowledge flows 
38.to compensate for low wages 
39.to create room for personal responsibility 
40.to create room for personal input and creativity 
41. to offer the workers opportunities for personal development 
42.to improve the wuality of work life 
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